At the Reuters Events: Automotive Europe conference in Frankfurt, there was a poll asking whether European OEMs are in a good position to fight back.

Most people seemed to think they are.

I am less sure.

Not because European OEMs have no strengths. They clearly do.

They have brands, engineering depth, dealer networks, service structures, fleet relationships, leasing expertise and decades of customer trust.

But that is exactly why the Nokia or even the Eastman Kodak Company comparison matters.

Nokia also looked strong before it lost the mobile phone business.

It was not stupid.

It was not blind.

It was not short of talented people.

People inside saw the challenge. One former Nokia person at the conference made exactly that point.

And still, seeing the challenge was not enough.

The real question was whether the organization could move fast enough while it was still successful.

That is the question for European automotive now.

Do European OEMs have assets to fight back?

Yes.

But are those assets enough if decision-making is slow, cost structures are heavy, software remains difficult, and too much energy goes into defending the old model?

I am not convinced.

The danger for Europe is not that Chinese OEMs are perfect.

They are not.

Their weaknesses in Europe are real: aftersales, used cars, residual values, leasing economics, fleet confidence and local trust.

But if one or two of them solve those weaknesses while Europe is still debating how unfair the competition is, the market can move very quickly.

That is what incumbents often underestimate.

They mistake strength for safety.

And they mistake awareness for action.

The uncomfortable question is not whether European OEMs can fight back.

Of course they can.

The question is whether they can change fast enough while they still believe they are in a strong position.